Freedom And Responsibility
By DON FIER
Early on in our consideration of the moral life, an entire column was devoted to the dignity of the human person, a reality “rooted in his creation in the image and likeness of God” (Catechism of the Catholic Church [CCC], n. 1700).
We saw that our dignity as rational beings is so great that the Vatican II Fathers unhesitatingly declared that man is “the only creature on earth that God has willed for its own sake” (Gaudium et Spes [GS], n. 24 § 3).
As expressed in post-apostolic times by the second-century Church Father, bishop, and martyr St. Irenaeus of Lyons: “Man is rational and therefore like God; he is created with free will and is master over his acts” (Adversus Haereses 4, 4, 3; as cited in CCC, n. 1730).
In essence, this means that we “are to reach our destiny by our own free choice,” explains the Servant of God Fr. John A. Hardon, SJ:
“We are to seek our Creator without coercion and, freely embracing Him, are to attain full and blessed perfection.” Based on the faculties of intellect and will, man has been created with “the power to act or not act, to do this or that: in other words, to perform deliberate actions by ourselves.” Fr. Hardon goes on to affirm that this gift of freedom is made perfect “when it is directed toward God, our Beatitude” (The Faith, p. 153).
It was demonstrated last week that human freedom is intimately linked to truth, for as Jesus solemnly proclaimed, “You will know the truth, and the truth will make you free” (John 8:32).
In his excellent commentary on Pope St. John Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis Splendor (VS), Fr. William F. Maestri cogently and accurately explains the implication of this foundational aspect of man’s rational nature: “At the heart of what it means to be human is the desire to know and do the truth” (What the Church Teaches: A Guide for the Study of Veritatis Splendor [G-VS], p. 9). In other words, we have been created with an innate desire to search out and come to know the truth, and then to do what is right and good.
Yet, as we also saw last week, contemporary society has divorced freedom from truth. Many people have come to confuse freedom with license, that is, “freedom becomes nothing more than acting on emotions or individual desires” (G-VS, pp. 26-27). Moreover, people do not heed what Revelation clearly teaches, that “the power to decide what is good and evil does not belong to man, but to God alone” (VS, n. 35 § 2).
Objective, unchanging truth is denied and man fails to recognize that “there is no true freedom except in the service of what is good and just” (CCC, n. 1733). Rather, men lose authentic freedom and become “slaves of sin” (Romans 6:17).
With freedom, then, comes responsibility. A distinction, however, must be made: “Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they are voluntary” (CCC, n. 1734). Thus, as inferred by the word “voluntary,” it is realistic to speak of human responsibility only if the existence of free will is acknowledged. Likewise, it is necessary to define what constitutes a properly “human act” to gain an understanding of this topic.
St. Thomas Aquinas contrasts acts which do not proceed from deliberation (acts of man) with “actions [that] are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will” (Summa Theologiae [STh] I-II, Q. 1, art. 1). As examples of the former, he lists undeliberated actions such as when one reflexively moves one’s foot or hand, or scratches one’s beard, while one’s mind is occupied by something else. Such actions “do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of human actions” (STh I-II, Q. 1, art. 1, ad 3).
A properly human act, on the other hand, is defined by St. Thomas as a voluntary act which comes from an interior principle (such as the will) with knowledge or awareness of the end for which it is done (cf. STh I-II, Q. 6, art. 2). “The fact that man is master of his actions,” says the Angelic Doctor, “is due to his being able to deliberate about them” (cf. STh I-II, Q. 6, art. 2, ad 2).
Two basic components constitute this definition: the action must be freely chosen by the will and the result or end must be known by the intellect. Consequently, if a person does not will something, responsibility can be nullified or at least diminished. The same is true if there is inadequate knowledge on the part of the agent.
What about the voluntary failure to act? An important principle in the moral life is that one is responsible not only for his voluntary actions, but also for voluntary decisions not to act when he should have and could have. For example, suppose a person misses Mass on Sunday simply out of laziness or indifference. That person would be morally culpable for his failure to act.
How do we grow in mastery of our will? The Catechism lists three ways: by making progress in virtue, by growing in knowledge of what is good, and by the exercise of asceticism or self-discipline (cf. CCC, n. 1734).
Virtue, as defined by Fr. Hardon, is “a good habit that enables a person to act according to right reason enlightened by faith” (Modern Catholic Dictionary, pp. 563-564). The moral virtues are acquired through human effort aided by God’s grace.
“The virtuous person,” teaches the Catechism, “tends toward the good with all his sensory and spiritual powers; he pursues the good and chooses it in concrete actions” (CCC, n. 1803).
The Catechism next enumerates several factors by which the culpability for an action can be lessened or even eliminated: “ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social factors” (CCC, n. 1735). As an example, let us look closely at ignorance, in particular at the difference between culpable and invincible ignorance.
A general principle in moral theology is that one is not responsible for ignorance that he could not avoid and did not have the obligation to avoid. This topic is one of crucial relevance in today’s society because people often prefer — even will — to be ignorant so as not to have to change their way of life. They consciously and deliberately do not seek the truth because it would mean giving up an immoral lifestyle or making changes such that they would no longer “fit in” with their social circle or society in general.
If this is the motivating reason for remaining in ignorance, it is voluntary and the person is culpable for it.
Culpable ignorance can be direct or indirect. It is direct if a person intentionally wills not to be informed about something he could and should have known. Indirect culpable ignorance, on the other hand, is perhaps most commonly the result of negligence in today’s society: a person fails to seek the truth or knowledge about something he should and could have, and didn’t even think about it.
A classic example is having knowledge of traffic laws. By the very act of getting behind the wheel of an automobile, a person assumes the responsibility for knowing the posted speed limits for his route of travel. Even though he does not directly will to not know the speed limit, his obligation to know it remains. The state trooper who stops him will not accept as an excuse that he inadvertently missed the traffic sign posting the speed limit.
Knowledge of holy days of obligation fits in a similar category for Catholics. If one misses Mass due to not being informed because of negligence, if he could and should have known simply by checking the Sunday bulletin, he is culpably ignorant.
Ignorance is invincible when it is not willed and is not the result of negligence. In other words, it is not something one could have and should have known. For example, a bushman in the remote jungles of Africa who did not ever have the opportunity to know the true faith has invincible ignorance. It is ignorance that was not chosen directly by an act of the will, or indirectly through negligence; it could not have been overcome. Deliberation here and now is thus affected by ignorance that one did not choose. Ignorance is culpable only if it is, in some way, a direct or indirect product of the will.
The Catechism goes on to affirm that “every act directly willed is imputable to its author” (CCC, n. 1736), and then provides several examples from the Old Testament to demonstrate the truth of this statement.
After having eaten of the forbidden fruit from “the tree of knowledge of good and evil” (Gen. 2:17), Eve is asked by the Lord, “What is this that you have done?” (Gen. 3:13). Cain is asked the same question after killing his brother Abel out of envy (see Gen. 4:10). Likewise, King David was subjected to a similar line of questioning after committing adultery with the wife of Uriah and then having him killed to cover it up (cf. 2 Samuel 12:7-15).
However, “a bad effect is not imputable if it was not willed either as an end or as a means of an action” (CCC, n. 1737). For example, consider the death of a first responder in a crisis situation. To be imputable, the bad effect must be foreseeable and the person must have the possibility of avoiding it (e.g., a drunken driver who commits manslaughter).
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(Don Fier serves on the board of directors for The Catholic Servant, a Minneapolis-based monthly publication. He and his wife are the parents of seven children. Fier is a 2009 graduate of Ave Maria University’s Institute for Pastoral Theology. He is a Consecrated Marian Catechist.)
