By JUDE DOUGHERTY
Rescher, Nicholas. Espionage, Statecraft and the Theory of Reporting: A Philosophical Theory on Intelligence Management. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017. Pp. vii+179.
Given the bias and irresponsibility of major print, audio, and visual media, this is a timely treatise on standards with respect to reporting, especially on matters of state. Nicholas Rescher modestly calls it: “A general introduction to the theory of reporting.” His focus is primarily on reports relevant to matters of state, that is, those involving diplomacy and warfare.
Rescher comes to his topic with ample personal experience and academic credentials. A former Marine assigned to an intelligence unit, and a longtime professor of the philosophy of science at the University of Pittsburgh, with dozens of books to his credit, he is co-chair of the Center for Philosophy of Science. A logician by early training, he became an authority in medieval Arabic logic and a career-long student of the work of G.W. Leibniz. As a student of Leibniz, he has been instrumental in the reconstruction of the German mathematician and philosopher’s cipher machina deciphratoria, ancestor to the famous Enigma cipher machine utilized in the 1920s and in World War II.
Rescher is also known as the co-author of the “Delphi method of forecasting.”
This book is difficult to categorize. G.K. Chesterton could write an essay on a bedpost or on some other trivial household or garden object. The medieval historian and philosopher, Etienne Gilson, had a penchant to research and publish on topics only tangentially related to his professorial occupation. Thus we have two delightful books, among others, from Gilson’s pen, Heloise and Abelard and Choir of Muses. Rescher’s 179-page treatise falls into the Chesterton genre. One may say, it is informative, eye-opening, and not without entertainment value.
Rescher acknowledges that the term “report” is an equivocal one, one that can be applied from the most trivial to the most momentous of accounts. He provides many examples and discusses criteria appropriate to each. There is obviously a big difference between the report of three-year-old Karen who tells a visitor, “The kitty lives in the blue house,” and the loudspeaker that blares, “Air-raid: This is not a drill.” As an ex-Marine, Rescher knows what it means “to report,” or to be put “on report.” Whistleblowing he takes to be a dramatic mode of reporting. Predictions and forecasts, he thinks, too, are a kind of reporting. Hearsay reporting he dismisses because it compromises authenticity.
As a professor specializing in the philosophy of science with dozens of books to his credit that span the range of philosophy, one should not be surprised to find references to David Hume, Pierre Laplace, and John Stuart Mill cropping up in this treatise.
In support of his contention that the prime function of useful reportage is to yield information for effective guidance of action, he uses an episode in the career of John Stuart Mill who in 1858 filed a report on the East India Company’s stewardship of the subcontinent. It was judged by Lord Grey, then British colonial secretary, to have been the best written report he had ever read. Mill was rewarded with the then astonishing sum of 5,000 pounds.
A report does nothing for the recipient who is not equipped to understand it. This puts an obligation on the reporter to keep in mind the recipient’s level of comprehension. Garbling is another pitfall. Winston Churchill, in the interest of clarity, had little confidence in what was conveyed only orally, and demanded confirmation of oral reports in writing.
When speaking of state and military intelligence, Rescher makes a vital distinction between information for its own sake and information for guidance. “Intelligence,” he advises, must always be relevant to real political and military purposes and must be accurate, precise, and verifiable. Of spies and counterspies, history reveals that “it is far from easy to spot a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” Rescher cites as examples the cases involving Alger Hiss, Klaus Fuchs, and Anthony Blunt.
Rescher concludes with the acknowledgment that evaluating reports prepared for purposes of state is a complex business. There is an inevitable gap between the supporting evidence provided and the objective factual claims often based upon it. The information actually at our disposal in many matters confirms our claims but does not always demonstrate them. One is reminded of Plato’s discussion in the Meno where in introducing the notion of “true opinion,” Plato has Socrates speak of the value of such knowledge. True opinion although supported by fact falls short of demonstrative knowledge but is nevertheless required by those who would govern.
“Men,” says Socrates, “become good and useful to states not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion.”
Given the practical wisdom offered in this volume, it could well be required reading for any high school or college journalism class, and promoted for principled guidance to others, especially those who report on matters of state.
Powered by WPtouch Mobile Suite for WordPress